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URBAN POLITICS AND THE
ASSIMILATION OF IMMIGRANT VOTERS
Rick Su*
INTRODUCTION
In the run-up to the contentious presidential election of 2012, the immigrant
vote was once again a matter of political concern. There was growing alarm within
the Republican Party that their platform on immigration alienated Latinos, the fastest
growing demographic in the country.1 Conversely, Democrats hoped that their fail-
ure to enact comprehensive immigration reform would not dissuade immigrant sup-
porters from going to the polls.2 All the while, efforts to mobilize immigrant voters
were unveiled. A broad coalition of immigrant-advocacy organizations announced
a massive naturalization drive to help immigrants apply for and gain U.S. citizenship,
thus adding them to the voter rolls for the November election.3
The lip service directed towards immigrant voters by both major parties shows
just how much the latest wave of immigration has reshaped the demographic land-
scape of American politics. Yet, as the naturalization drive reveals, immigrants have
not fully taken advantage of their political power, and political parties have not been
all that active in mobilizing them. Immigrant groups today vote at lower rates than
natives.4 They also vote at lower rates than earlier immigrant groups at the mid-
nineteenth and turn of the twentieth century.5 Moreover, there is growing evidence
to suggest that immigrant political participation in newer destination cities like Los
Angeles, where the immigrant population has exploded in recent decades, is partic-
ularly depressed, especially when compared to older gateway cities like New York.6
* Associate Professor of Law, SUNY–Buffalo Law School. Dartmouth College, B.A.;
Harvard Law School, J.D.
1 See Jonathan Weisman, Rubio, in Appeal to G.O.P.’s Conscience, Urges Compromise
on Dream Act, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2012, at A14.
2 See Julia Preston, While Seeking Support, Obama Faces a Frustrated Hispanic
Electorate, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2012, at A10.
3 See Campaign 2012: Voting Naturalization Push Advances, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 22,
2012, at A6.
4 See Adam Nagourney, Latino Growth Not Fully Felt at Voting Booth, N.Y. TIMES,
June 10, 2012, at A20N (discussing lower rates of voter registration among Hispanics—
though not necessarily immigrants—than among white or black Americans).
5 See RON HAYDUK, DEMOCRACY FOR ALL 30 (2006).
6 See generally John Mollenkopf et al., Immigrant Political Participation in New
York and Los Angeles, in GOVERNING AMERICAN CITIES 17, 50, 57–59 (Michael Jones-
Correa ed., 2001).
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What accounts for these different rates of political participation? Explana-
tions thus far have largely focused on the immigrants themselves. Legal scholars
have turned their attention to how legal rules have redefined the political life of
immigrants—from the obstacles they face in naturalizing,7 to the changing signi-
ficance of citizenship in a world of globalization, temporary residency, and dual
citizenship.8 At the same time, social scientists have offered a rich account of the
political lives of immigrants by focusing on their individual and group character-
istics. Level of education, proficiency with English, cultural norms, and even the
political system of their home countries have been used to explain the voting be-
havior of immigrants today.9
Each of these accounts offers important insights. Yet, the explanation they offer
is incomplete. This is because the legal and social characteristics of immigrants today
are only one half of the political equation. What has largely been overlooked is the
political structure that immigrants face in the United States once they arrive. In other
words, in our eagerness to identify how immigrants today are different from those
in the past, we have failed to appreciate how the political system has changed as well.
To address this gap, this essay foregrounds political structure in explaining the
voting behavior of immigrants in the United States. In particular, it focuses on one
aspect of the American political system that is closely intertwined with the political
life of immigrants but is often ignored in the immigration literature: big city politics.
Immigrant groups have long settled in concentrated residential patterns, and often
in America’s major cities.10 Moreover, since the early days of industrialization, big
city governments have controlled a disproportionate share of the resources and op-
portunities in American society, raising the stakes of urban politics.11 Given these
two dynamics, it is often in big cities that immigrant groups begin to wield political
influence, and also translate that influence into tangible gains.12 It is therefore not
surprising that few political institutions in the United States have evolved as much
in response to immigrant political participation as those that govern the nation’s
major cities.
7 See, e.g., Linda Bosniak, Essay, Universal Citizenship and the Problem of Alienage,
94 NW. U. L. REV. 963, 976 (2000).
8 See PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP 6 (2008).
9 See, e.g., S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN, DEMOCRACY IN IMMIGRANT AMERICA 72,
160, 165–66 (2005).
10 See Michael Jones-Correa, Comparative Approaches to Changing Interethnic Relations
in Cities, in GOVERNING AMERICAN CITIES, supra note 6.
11 SVEN BECKERT, THE MONIED METROPOLIS: NEW YORK CITY AND THE CONSOLIDATION
OF THE AMERICAN BOURGEOISIE, 1850–1896, at 3–4 (2001) (“Capital and capitalists gather
in cities, and nowhere did economic, social, and political power coalesce more than in New
York City. . . . [T]heir economic, social, and political power reverberated from California to
South Carolina, from the factory to the farm, from City Hall to the White House.”).
12 See infra text accompanying notes 130–34.
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Simply stated, my argument is that the disparate political behavior of immigrants
corresponds with different eras in urban governance, each of which developed in re-
sponse to the growing political power of immigrants. For the first wave of immi-
grants who arrived in the mid- to late nineteenth century, their political lives were
shaped by the rise of machine politics, which maintained power through mass polit-
ical mobilization and the exchange of votes for tangible goods and services.13 The
arrival of the second wave of immigrants in the early twentieth century coincided with
the growth of the reform city, which sought to disentangle urban governance—and the
spoils associated with it—from the political process, and were maintained in large part
through voter suppression.14 The legacies of the machine and reform cities still re-
main with us today, which help to explain different political behavior in different
cities.15 Yet it is also true that with the increasing suburbanization and “districting”
of our metropolitan regions, immigrants of the third wave are also increasingly en-
countering a fragmented city, in which voting with one’s feet by moving from one
jurisdiction to another is more effective than voting at the ballot box.16
At the most basic level, this historical analysis of urban political structures pre-
sents an alternative account of immigrant political participation in the United States.
It offers an explanation for why immigrant political participation varies throughout
American history and across different regions. It also shows how the very legal struc-
ture of the city has been continuously shaped by and in response to the fact that cities
often serve as the first site of immigrant political mobilization.17 Taken together, all
of this highlights the long legacy that these earlier struggles, and the political struc-
tures that they produced, have on immigrant political participation today.
At a deeper level, however, the evolving structure of urban politics is also
important for what it means about the political assimilation of immigrants into
American society. Indeed, if local politics are, as many describe it, a “schoolhouse-of-
democracy,”18 the constantly evolving structure of urban politics reveals that the
lesson immigrants learn can vary widely from one jurisdiction to another, and from
one generation to the next. In other words, not only are there many different paths
to political assimilation, but what counts as political assimilation can also vary
widely depending on the existing political structure. We may look back nostalgically
13 See infra text accompanying notes 70–82.
14 See infra text accompanying notes 203, 211–18.
15 Cf. STEPHEN MACEDO ET AL., DEMOCRACY AT RISK 86 (2005) (“[M]achine politics left
a legacy of higher turnout than in cities that adopted reform institutions.”).
16 See infra text accompanying notes 309–11.
17 See AMY BRIDGES, MORNING GLORIES 7–9 (1997) (discussing how the reform move-
ment’s restructuring of city government was partially a response to immigrants’ participation
in the patronage programs run by machine politics, and their later rise to power within those
machines); Jones-Correa, supra note 10, at 1–2.
18 See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Romancing the Town: Why We (Still) Need a Democratic
Defense of City Power, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2028 (2000).
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at the immense political mobilization of urban immigrants in the nineteenth century
as a type of political assimilation that immigrants have failed to undergo today. Yet,
for reformers at the time, it was precisely this kind of mass mobilization that was
upheld as evidence that immigrants were incapable of assimilating into the political
culture of the United States.19
This essay proceeds as follows. Part I sets out in more detail the reasoning behind
the approach taken in this study. Namely, it explains why urban politics provide a
good lens for understanding immigrant political participation, and why immigration
is a good lens for studying the development of urban political structures. Part II out-
lines three models of urban governance—the machine city, the reform city, and the
fragmented city—and shows how each were a response to, and also served to shape,
the political behavior of immigrants in the United States. Part III discusses some of
the implications of this for how we think about political assimilation in the United
States, and the promises and dangers of political participation by immigrants.
I. NEGOTIATING IMMIGRANT POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Designing a system of immigration is difficult for any nation. It is particularly
challenging in a democracy. The recurring controversy over immigration in the United
States is not only fueled by competing views about the social and economic impact
of admitting immigrants, it is also spurred by divisions over the question of when,
and to what degree, immigrants can make demands on our political system and shape
how substantive policies are made.20 In short, the stakes of immigration policymaking
are raised substantially when it must address not only the physical entry of immigrants,
but also their political admission into the national polity.
This tension between the demands of our immigration system and the values of
our democratic system is only partially negotiated through federal policymaking on
immigration or naturalization. Rather, as I argue here, much of this negotiation also
takes place at the local level. Indeed, for much of American history, the political be-
havior of successive waves of immigrant groups has been shaped by the structure
of the urban political system.21 At the same time, given the tremendous role that im-
migrants have historically played in nearly every significant period of urban devel-
opment in the United States, the structures of America’s cities have also been made
and remade in response to perceptions about immigrants’ political assimilation.22
19 See HAYDUK, supra note 5, at 29–30.
20 See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Rights of Migrants: An Optimal Contract
Framework, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1403, 1421, 1425 (2009).
21 See STEVEN P. ERIE, RAINBOW’S END: IRISH-AMERICANS AND THE DILEMMAS OF
URBAN MACHINE POLITICS, 1840–1985, at 19, 22–23, 35 (1988) (analyzing how changing
political machine structure influenced immigrant political involvement).
22 See infra Part II.A.3 (describing the relationship between mass immigration and the
rise of machine politics and the patronage system); infra notes 326–29 and accompanying
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The historical connection between immigrant politics and the evolving structure
of big city governments will be the focus in subsequent parts. The goal here is to set
out in more detail why cities have come to assume this role. To be sure, immigration
scholars have not traditionally given much attention to urban political structure as
a means of understanding the incorporation of immigrants into the national polity.23
Yet, as I argue below, there are good reasons to turn our focus from the national to
the local in thinking about immigrant political participation. More specifically, I
present the following three lines of argument. First, it is often in urban settings that
significant political conflicts between immigrants and natives first arise. Second, the
malleability of urban political structure offers a useful and flexible means of negoti-
ating the political impact of immigration. Third, because urban political structures
shape and are shaped by immigrant political behavior, studying these structures tell
us a lot about the changing conceptualizations of immigrant political assimilation
over time.
A. The Site of Political Conflict
Urban political structures are important for understanding immigrant political
assimilation because it is often in urban settings that political conflicts between im-
migrants and natives first arise.24 The reasons for this are twofold.
The first reason is simply a matter of demographics. Immigrants have historically
congregated with fellow members of their ethnic group, and have done so dispropor-
tionately in America’s largest cities.25 Combined with the relative ease by which im-
migrants can naturalize as citizens, early residential concentration among immigrants
can often lead to significant political power later on.26 The foreign-born population
in the United States has never exceeded 15%.27 Yet, their proportion of the urban
electorate is usually significantly larger. For example, in the 1920s, the percentage
of foreign-born voters in cities with more than 250,000 residents was approximately
text (explaining how nativist groups that called for voter suppression were motivated by the
concern that immigrants had not been sufficiently assimilated); see also RICHARD ALBA &
VICTOR NEE, REMAKING THE AMERICAN MAINSTREAM 22 (2003) (discussing immigrants’
movement from ethnic neighborhoods to working-class neighborhoods or suburbs as they
assimilate); Part II.C.1 (showing how the modern fragmentation of political spaces into sep-
arate and autonomous towns, counties, and districts has lead to weakened local governments
and a decline in voter-mobilization efforts by political parties).
23 Jones-Correa, supra note 10, at 2.
24 See Michael Jones-Correa, Structural Shifts and Institutional Capacity: Possibilities
for Ethnic Cooperation and Conflict in Urban Settings, in Governing American Cities, supra
note 6, at 183, 196 (discussing clashes involving new immigrants in urban areas).
25 See, e.g., ROGER DANIELS, COMING TO AMERICA 185 (2d ed. 2002).
26 See Mollenkopf et al., supra note 6, at 21 (describing groups as “ripe for political
mobilization”).
27 See RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 9, at 28.
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40%; when the children of the foreign-born were added to the tally, the figure jumped
to nearly 70%.28 What this means is that long before an immigrant group assumes
any significant degree of influence on national politics, it is likely to have already
become a formidable, if not dominant constituency in a particular local community.
Second, immigrant politics matter more in cities than any other local jurisdiction
because there is simply more at stake. Over the years, many different types of com-
munities have seen a large influx of immigrants: rural villages, frontier settlements,
company towns.29 In none of those, however, are their associated local governments
able to control as much wealth and as many opportunities as big city governments.30
Because of the tremendous amount of human and financial capital contained in cities,
urban governments normally have more resources to draw from.31 Redistributive pos-
sibilities are also enhanced by the higher degrees of class diversity that are typically
found in urban settings.32 In other words, for the immigrant groups that succeed in
securing local political power, urban politics often offers a larger pie from which
they can seek to carve out their share.
Given the higher likelihood that immigrant groups can exercise real and mean-
ingful power in urban America, it is no wonder that urban politics has long been a
backdrop for immigrant-native tensions.33 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, urban politics pitted immigrants against natives on such issues as religious
schooling, temperance, and labor practices.34 In the late twentieth century and into the
first decade of the twenty-first, cities have also become the site of political battles over
language education, government services, and immigration enforcement.35 To be sure,
few of these issues are necessarily about immigrants as immigrants per se. In many
of these fights, the immigrant label is merely shorthand for the working class, the
urban poor, or a racial other.36 Yet, because of the role that immigrants have histori-
cally played in America’s urban development, it is not uncommon for conventional
urban issues to be portrayed as struggles between immigrant and native residents.37
28 See NILES CARPENTER, DEP’T OF COMMERCE, IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR CHILDREN
167–68 (1927).
29 See, e.g., Christopher W. Post, The Making of a Federal Company Town: Sunflower
Village, Kansas, in COMPANY TOWNS IN THE AMERICAS 111, 114 (Oliver J. Dinius & Angela
Vergara eds., 2011); Yda Schreuder, Americans by Choice and Circumstances: Dutch Prot-
estant and Dutch Catholic Immigrants in Wisconsin, 1850–1905, in WISCONSIN LAND AND
LIFE 320, 320–21 (Robert C. Ostergren & Thomas R. Vale eds., 1997).
30 See BECKERT, supra note 11, at 79.
31 See id.
32 See AMY BRIDGES, A CITY IN THE REPUBLIC: ANTEBELLUM NEW YORK AND THE
ORIGINS OF MACHINE POLITICS 45–48 (1984).
33 BECKERT, supra note 11, at 82.
34 See MALDWYN ALLEN JONES, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 216–20 (2d ed. 1992).
35 See, e.g., PETER SCHRAG, NOT FIT FOR OUR SOCIETY 174–77 (2010).
36 See id. at 5; see also BECKERT, supra note 11, at 82.
37 See SCHRAG, supra note 35, at 213–14.
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B. Managing Immigrant Political Power
Urban politics is not only where most immigrant groups first secure meaningful
political power;38 it is also the means by which Americans have long sought to man-
age the potential political power of immigrant newcomers.39 Indeed, altering and
adjusting the structure and incentives of urban politics is often an easier and more
effective means of responding to the political impact of large immigrant influxes
than turning to federal naturalization or immigration laws.40
Urban political structures are useful in this regard because, in most cases, they
are highly malleable. Unlike the state and federal government, there are few, if any,
constitutional constraints on how local governments can be organized. Indeed, in
most states, all that is required is a state legislative act or a local referendum.41 Nor
are there as many moral constraints when it comes to the structure of local govern-
ments; principles of political equality and democratic representation have tradition-
ally been less established at the local level than at the state or federal level.42
Not only is the structure of urban politics malleable, but it is also quite effective
as a means of influencing political behavior. Many have argued that different struc-
tural arrangements—such as whether a city is governed by mayor or a city manager,
or whether local offices are selected through at-large or district elections—not only
affects overall turnout at the polls, but also who is likely to vote.43 As such, local
political structures offer ways to adjust the political impact of any particular vote on
the ultimate electoral outcome. They also offer ways to alter the incentives to local
political participation by changing the amount of real power that local governments
possess. All of these offer ways in which immigrant political power can be expanded
or contained once it blossoms in urban political settings.
The flexibility and effectiveness of urban political structures as a means of nego-
tiating immigrant political power is most evident when compared to more traditional
means of doing the same: federal naturalization and immigration laws. Urban polit-
ical reforms ordinarily do not evoke as many moral objections compared to natu-
ralization reform,44 even though in some cases it might be just as effective a means
of managing immigrant political power.45 At the same time, it can be targeted more
38 See Jones-Correa, supra note 10, at 10–13.
39 MACEDO ET AL., supra note 15, at 86.
40 Compare HAYDUK, supra note 5, at 3 (describing the political exclusion of immigrants
at the national level), with MACEDO, supra note 15, at 86 (describing the mobilization of
urban politics among immigrants).
41 See TERRY CHRISTENSEN & TOM HOGEN-ESCH, LOCAL POLITICS 90–91 (2d ed. 2006).
42 See id. at 98.
43 See MACEDO ET AL., supra note 15, at 86–87, 162; see also Robert R. Alford & Eugene
C. Lee, Voting Turnout in American Cities, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 809–10 (1968).
44 See Bosniak, supra note 7, at 963–64 (noting the dramatic public policy debates relat-
ing to naturalization and the privileges of citizens).
45 See Cox & Posner, supra note 20, at 1425.
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narrowly than immigration regulations, which is effective at excluding or removing
certain immigrant groups, but not so good at calibrating their political influence
while still permitting their physical presence in the country. This is not to say that
managing immigrant political power in this manner is right or even wise. It is simply
to say that for those who are interested in doing so, urban political structures offer
an unconventional but effective tool.
C. Reshaping Immigrant Political Assimilation
What may be most striking about the role of urban political structures in the
immigration context is how they shape the very definition of what constitutes polit-
ical assimilation in this country. At the most basic level, it is because urban political
structures themselves are designed around the prevailing model of political citizen-
ship at the time.46 Given the extent to which the immigrant exposure to the American
political process begins at the local level,47 the structure of our urban political sys-
tem presents not only a model for immigrants to follow, but also a rubric through
which their assimilation can be assessed.
At a deeper level, however, studying urban political structures also exposes how
the process of incorporating immigrants politically has, in return, shaped political
structures in the United States. As Professors Richard Alba and Victor Nee remind
us, assimilation is a two-way street—as immigrants adjust to fit into American so-
ciety, the American society they are assimilating into is also being changed in the
process.48 This is not only true with respect to the social and the cultural dimensions
of the assimilation process. It is also the case when it comes to the political assimila-
tion of immigrants into the American polity.49 As we will see, this is especially true
at the local level, where political responses to each wave of immigration have made
and remade the legal and political identities of the city time and time again. As a re-
sult, excavating the different layers of our urban political structure offers important
insights into not only how our political institutions have changed immigrants, but
also how immigrants have changed our political institutions.
II. THE ROLE OF URBAN POLITICAL STRUCTURE
As we considered in Part I, there are good reasons to believe that immigrant
political power in the United States is shaped in large part by the legal and political
structure of its cities. It is often in cities and metropolitan areas where immigrant
46 See MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE GOOD CITIZEN 173–82 (1998) (discussing changing ideas
on citizenship and political performance).
47 See Jones-Correa, supra note 10, at 1–2.
48 ALBA & NEE, supra note 22, at 11.
49 See JONES, supra note 34, at 297–99 (discussing immigrant influence on American
politics).
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groups first gain access to political power.50 It is also frequently in these urban con-
texts that political rifts between immigrants and natives first arise.51 This Part turns
to an examination of the historical record. More specifically, it compares the rela-
tionship between immigrant political behavior and urban political structure during
each of the three great waves of immigration to the United States: the first from 1820
to 1860,52 the second from 1890 to 1920,53 and the third from 1970 to the present day.54
For each of these periods I make three separate observations. First, I outline the
urban political structures that immigrants faced in each of these periods, which I
refer to as the machine city, the reform city, and the fragmented city. Second, I ex-
amine the extent to which these urban forms were not only a response to, but also
an influence on the political behavior of immigrants at the time. Third, I comment
on the different “lessons” that these urban political structures offered to immigrants,
and how they were received as models of immigrant political assimilation.
A. Political Mobilization and the Machine City
The immigrants of the first great wave of immigration were no strangers to the
political process.55 This was particularly true for the large number of Irish immi-
grants who settled in America’s fast-growing cities.56 It is widely assumed today that
immigrants participate in politics only after a long period of political assimilation.57
Yet, for the immigrants who arrived in the mid-nineteenth century, the stereotype
could not have been more different.58 They naturalized quickly and voted often.59 In-
deed, in many electoral districts, immigrant turnout at the polls frequently exceeded
that of natives.60 The main concern was not their political apathy, but rather that they
were too heavily involved in the political process.61
At the center of the relationship between immigrants and the political process
were the urban political machines—partisan organizations that exploited the evolving
50 See Jones-Correa, supra note 10, at 1–2.
51 See JONES, supra note 34, at 130–31.
52 See id. at 78–80.
53 See id. at 152–56.
54 See SCHRAG, supra note 35, at 163–64.
55 See JONES, supra note 34, at 99.
56 See BRIDGES, supra note 32, at 4 (suggesting that certain values and expectation com-
mon to Irish immigrants, along with their tendency to settle in the same neighborhoods, gave
rise to “ethnic politics” which allowed machine politics to flourish).
57 See John R. Logan et al., The Impact of Race and Ethnicity, Immigration, and Political
Context on Participation in American Electoral Politics, 90 SOC. FORCES 993, 994 (2010).
58 See JONES, supra note 34, at 121–23.
59 See HAYDUK, supra note 5, at 30 (noting the high voter turnout during the nineteenth
century, before there was widespread disenfranchisement of noncitizens).
60 Mollenkopf et al., supra note 6, at 49.
61 See HAYDUK, supra note 5, at 29–30.
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structure of big city governments to seize control of local political power.62 America’s
first great wave of immigration coincided with the rise of machine politics.63 It was
largely due to the machines that the immigrants of this era came to be so deeply inte-
grated into the political system.64 For most of the nineteenth century, then, immigrants
faced an urban political system that was both tailored to and organized around their
involvement and participation.65 Yet, this relationship also became a point of con-
tention. Although it led to the mass political participation of immigrants at the polls,
critics were quick to portray it as a breakdown of political assimilation.66
1. The Rise of the Machine
The political system that immigrants encountered in the mid-nineteenth century
was one in transition. On the one hand, the elite-controlled politics of the post-
revolutionary period was giving way to an era of mass political mobilization.67 On
the other hand, with the onset of urbanization, the political center of American life
was shifting away from town hall meetings and rural country elections, and towards
the hustle and bustle of big city politics.68 What emerged was a political system that
rewarded broad-based organizing through political parties, and a service-oriented
model of government.69
No political institution did more to capitalize on this new political reality than
the urban political machine.70 Some, like the famed Tammany Hall that operated out
of New York, managed to consolidate power and rule the city with few other com-
petitors.71 In other cities, as was the case in Chicago and Boston, a number of dif-
ferent machines competed.72 Although some prominent political machines would go
on to develop some power and influence at the state and federal level, most found
success largely at the local level and in America’s largest cities.73 Indeed, machines
came to dominate the political life of urban residents in nearly every major urban
center of the nineteenth century.74
62 See generally JOHN M. ALLSWANG, BOSSES, MACHINES, AND URBAN VOTERS (1986)
(exploring “bossism,” the success of political bosses in urban politics, and why it has attracted
so much scholarly interest).
63 See BRIDGES, supra note 32, at 4.
64 See JONES, supra note 34, at 121–23.
65 See ALLSWANG, supra note 62, at 29–30.
66 See HAYDUK, supra note 5, at 29–30.
67 SCHUDSON, supra note 46, at 5–6.
68 See BRIDGES, supra note 32, at 5.
69 See Alan DiGaetano, The Origins of Urban Political Machines in the United States:
A Comparative Perspective, 26 URB. AFF. Q. 324, 324 (1991).
70 See BRIDGES, supra note 32, at 146.
71 See ALLSWANG, supra note 62, at 41.
72 See ERIE, supra note 21, at 41–42; CYBELLE FOX, THREE WORLDS OF RELIEF 35 (2012).
73 See FOX, supra note 72, at 35 (describing machines and their success at the local level).
74 See id. (listing cities with prominent machines).
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Machines were frequently accused of “stealing” elections through fraud and
manipulation at the polls.75 Yet, their initial political strategy was fundamentally
populist in nature.76 Machines rose to power because they succeeded more than any
other organization in mobilizing the urban electorate.77 And patronage was at the
heart of this populist strategy.78 Simply stated, the “spoils” of political victory were
offered to voters for their support at the polls. For some, this meant jobs on the
city’s fast-growing payroll.79 For others, it was social services and direct aid, like
turkeys for the holidays and coal in the winter.80 Indeed, nearly every aspect of the
machine’s political organization revolved around cultivating a symbiotic relation-
ship between the machine and its urban supporters.81 As George Washington Plunkitt,
a prominent member of New York’s Tammany Hall once said, “How are you goin’
to interest our young men in their country if you have no offices to give them when
they work for their party?”82
Political machines succeeded because they were attuned to the urban political
structure of their time. More specifically, they were the first to take advantage of
two developments—one political and one economic—that reshaped the nature of big
city government in the mid-nineteenth century. The first was the rise of populist
politics following the abolition of the property requirement for voting.83 By granting
suffrage for the first time to nearly all white men in the country, politics was no lon-
ger the pastime of the elite, but also of the common man.84 This shifted the locus of
political power in the United States so that mass mobilization became an effective
electoral strategy.85 Moreover, it gave rise to a new political culture, one targeted
towards the broad voting public.86 Simply stated, politics in the nineteenth century
became a ruckus and rowdy affair. As a form of identification, it instilled loyalties
and incited brawls.87 As a form of entertainment, it drew crowds and prompted spon-
taneous parades.88 What emerged was a political system that rewarded candidates who
75 See ALLSWANG, supra note 62, at 5–6 (calling the perception of vote stealing largely
“inaccurate”).
76 Id.
77 See DiGaetano, supra note 69, at 329.
78 See FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS STILL DON’T
VOTE 53 (2000).
79 See SCHUDSON, supra note 46, at 147.
80 See DAVID KNOKE, POLITICAL NETWORKS 21 (1990).
81 See ALLSWANG, supra note 62, at 5–6.
82 WILLIAM L. RIORDON, PLUNKITT OF TAMMANY HALL 11 (1963).
83 See SCHUDSON, supra note 46, at 94–97.
84 See id. at 96–97.
85 See ALLSWANG, supra note 62, at 9 (describing the “mass base of the [political] machine”
as well-organized and powerful).
86 See DiGaetano, supra note 69, at 326, 329 (noting the extension of the franchise to the
working class).
87 See RICHARD B. STOTT, WORKERS IN THE METROPOLIS 238 (1990).
88 See GLENN C. ALTSCHULER & STUART M. BLUMIN, RUDE REPUBLIC 225 (2000).
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were able to weave politics into many aspects of their constituents’ lives.89 This was
a task to which the organizational structure of political machines was well suited.90
Second, the growing wealth and economic opportunities in cities provided the
machine leadership with the incentive and resources to focus on urban politics.91
Building and maintaining political machines requires a tremendous amount of or-
ganization and effort.92 Doing so through the use of patronage is also expensive and
taxing.93 The onset of urbanization, however, made the development of machine
politics possible at the local level. As capital and industry accumulated in America’s
major cities, urban governments were offered a tremendous pool of resources to col-
lect and redistribute.94 Moreover, as the cities grew, residents sought a more active
role for city governments.95 They demanded an expanded slate of local services—
such as policing, sanitation, utilities—which added tremendously to the municipal
payroll.96 They wanted more regulatory oversight of business and development, which
expanded the number of licenses and permits issued by the city.97 Residents also sought
additional infrastructure, which turned the city into a major source of construction
projects.98 Political machines were adept at finding ways to use these new municipal
responsibilities to bolster patronage operations, and thus political power.99
If the changing structure of big city governments provided political machines
with the means to secure and maintain political power, it also shaped the policies that
machine administration pursued once in office. Regardless of their partisan affil-
iations, Republican and Democratic machines alike pursued expansive and expen-
sive policies that sought to increase the role of government, and the role of the
machine in turn.100 This strategy placed them at substantial odds with the city’s elite,
who preferred low-tax, pro-growth strategies.101 Yet, it played well with the city’s
working-class base, who made up a majority of most urban electorates and saw local
government as a possible vehicle for redistribution.102
89 DiGaetano, supra note 69, at 394.
90 See id.
91 See BECKERT, supra note 11, at 4.
92 See ALLSWANG, supra note 62, at 22.
93 See id.
94 See BRIDGES, supra note 32, at 146.
95 See ALTSCHULER & BLUMIN, supra note 88, at 81.
96 See id.
97 See DiGaetano, supra note 69, at 324.
98 See id.
99 See id.
100 See ROGER DAVID WALDINGER, STILL THE PROMISED CITY? AFRICAN AMERICANS AND
NEW IMMIGRANTS IN POSTINDUSTRIAL NEW YORK 207–11 (1996); see also ALLSWANG,
supra note 62, at 92–95 (discussing competition between parties in Chicago).
101 See BECKERT, supra note 11, at 82.
102 See BRIDGES, supra note 32, at 4.
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2. Mass Mobilization and Mass Immigration
Immigrants arriving in the mid-nineteenth century had to navigate a fast-changing
political landscape, from the shift towards populist politics to the rise of the political
machine. Yet, one of the most significant political transformations of this period was
actually the tremendous influx of the immigrants themselves.103 More than four million
immigrants arrived between 1840 and 1860, at a time when the country’s population
was approximately twenty million.104 This number was especially high in America’s
cities.105 By 1870, nearly every one of America’s largest cities had a foreign-born pop-
ulation of at least 30 %.106 Indeed, in cities like New York, Chicago, and San Francisco,
the figure was closer to half.107
How did the urban political machines respond to this influx of immigrants? They
mobilized them.108 It is important to note that many of the bosses of these early po-
litical machines had no great love for the immigrant newcomers.109 Anti-immigrant
sentiment ran rampant at this time, especially against Catholics, and the Protestant
leadership of many early political machines was just as prejudiced as their political
rivals.110 Yet, nearly all of the political machines courted the immigrant vote for one
simple reason: in the contested political environment of the nineteenth century, po-
litical machines needed the immigrant vote to win.111 Notwithstanding their outsized
reputations, very few political machines in the nineteenth century had an entirely
secure hold on local political power.112 Thus, for them, immigrant mobilization was
simply a matter of numbers: “No ambitious political organization could with impu-
nity ignore such a large group of potential voters.”113
103 See JONES, supra note 34, at 178–79.
104 See id. at 79.
105 CAMPBELL GIBSON & KAY JUNG, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU POPULATION DIV., HISTORICAL
CENSUS STATISTICS ON THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES: 1850 TO
2000, at 89 (2006).
106 Id.
107 See id.
108 See ERIE, supra note 21, at 12 (discussing the success that the machines had in “mobi-
lizing and wooing” immigrant voters).
109 See id. at 12 (“Tammany’s Yankee party chieftains in the 1860s had as much revulsion
toward the Irish as Irish bosses after the turn of the century would have against Southern and
Eastern Europeans.”).
110 See TYLER ANBINDER, NATIVISM AND SLAVERY: THE NORTHERN KNOW NOTHINGS
AND THE POLITICS OF THE 1850S, at 87–88 (1992) (“[E]ven ‘Boss’ William M. Tweed,
famed for perfecting the immigrant-backed political machine, dabbled in nativism in the
early 1850s.”).
111 See ALLSWANG, supra note 62, at 41.
112 See id. at 93–95; ERIE, supra note 21, at 67.
113 See ALLSWANG, supra note 62, at 41.
666 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 21:653
For the most part, immigrants were quite receptive to this recruitment.114 Indeed,
they responded quite well to the machine’s patronage operations. Immigrants were
drawn to the services and aid that the machines offered; though “haphazard” and
“petty,”115 they filled a need that was not met by other political institution or organi-
zation.116 Immigrants also gravitated to the jobs that the political machines offered
for their political support.117 Though largely blue-collar and low-wage,118 they rep-
resented an opportunity to gain an economic foothold in their new adopted country.
It was during this time that immigrant groups like the Irish established a strong
ethnic niche in public employment,119 one that would persist well into the twentieth
century. It was also during this time that many ethnic occupational stereotypes (e.g.,
the Irish policeman) were born.120
Of course, for immigrants to be useful to the political machines, they had to be
eligible to vote. The goal of the machines, after all, was to win elections. Unfortu-
nately, very few of the major American cities in which machines fought for power
were located in the states that still permitted noncitizens to vote.121 As a result, ma-
chines not only worked hard to recruit immigrant supporters, they also went to great
lengths to naturalize them as voting citizens.122 Sometimes they did this on an un-
precedented scale.123 By all accounts, New York’s Tammany Hall operated not only
the largest “naturalization” operation of all the political machines in the country, but
quite possibly the largest effort attempted by any organization.124 As early as the 1820s,
a naturalization bureau had already been established to guide immigrants through
the naturalization process.125 By mid-century, the naturalization operation had ma-
tured to include not only headquarters in every ward that provided the necessary
paperwork and witness signatures to initiate the naturalization process, but also
ready access to machine-backed judges who were willing to turn a blind eye to
114 See PETER MCCAFFERY, WHEN BOSSES RULED PHILADELPHIA 125–26 (1993).
115 See id. at 125.
116 See id. (describing the many unmet needs of the machine’s constituents).
117 See ERIE, supra note 21, at 58–61.
118 See id. at 61.
119 See WALDINGER, supra note 100, at 209.
120 See id. (explaining how the Irish came to hold so many civil service positions, espe-
cially in the police force).
121 See HAYDUK, supra note 5, at 16–30 (describing waves of anti-immigrant sentiment
which led states to disenfranchise noncitizens).
122 See ALLSWANG, supra note 62, at 52; WILLIAM V. SHANNON, THE AMERICAN IRISH
69–70 (1966).
123 See ALLSWANG, supra note 62, at 52; SHANNON, supra note 122, at 69–70.
124 See ALLSWANG, supra note 62, at 52 (“Gustavus Myers estimated that in the six weeks
prior to the 1868 election, between 25,000 and 30,000 new citizens were naturalized, of whom
‘85 percent’ went on to vote for Tammany.”); SHANNON, supra note 122, at 69–70.
125 See GUSTAVUS MYERS, THE HISTORY OF TAMMANY HALL 151–52 (1901).
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inconsistencies or improprieties.126 On top of all this, all fees were paid for by
Tammany Hall.127 The number of citizens created through this effort is staggering.
From 1856 to 1867, about 9,207 immigrants a year naturalized, while, in 1868 alone,
an additional 41,112 became citizens in anticipation of that year’s gubernatorial
race.128 By 1886, it is estimated that nearly eighty percent of New York City’s Irish,
German, and Western European population from the first wave had been naturalized
through this operation.129
Recruited, naturalized, and given incentives to vote, the immigrants of the first
wave were steadfast supporters of the political machines.130 In time, however, they
would also come to run them.131 To be sure, the integration of immigrants into the
machine’s political leadership was a gradual process.132 While some were recruited
into positions of power as early as the 1850s and 1860s, most remained “foot sol-
diers” in the machine’s sprawling political organization.133 But political machines
soon recognized the importance of recruiting ward bosses and precinct captains from
the immigrant communities themselves, and by the turn of the twentieth century,
immigrants began to assume prominent roles in urban government at the highest
level.134 This was particularly true for the Irish, although Germans made political
gains as well.135 As Edward Alsworth Ross complained:
[O]f the eighteen principal personages in the city government
of Chicago [in 1912], fourteen had Irish names and three had
German names. Of the eleven principal officials in the city gov-
ernment of Boston, nine had Irish names. . . . In San Francisco,
the mayor, all the heads of the municipal departments, and ten
out of eighteen members on the board of supervisors bore names
reminiscent of the Green Isle.136
Indeed, he would go on to remark that “[t]he Irish domination of our Northern cities
is the broadest mark immigration has left on American politics.”137
126 See SHANNON, supra note 122, at 69–70.
127 See ERIE, supra note 21, at 51.
128 See id.
129 See id. at 53.
130 See MYERS, supra note 125, at 151–52.
131 See ERIE, supra note 21, at 3 (“Not only did the Irish predominate among urban eth-
nic party bases, but they were also the architects of the strongest and most long-lived big-
city machines.”).
132 See id. at 2–3.
133 See id.
134 Id. at 117.
135 See ERIE, supra note 21, at 3.
136 See EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS, THE OLD WORLD IN THE NEW 259 (1914).
137 Id. at 260.
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3. Political Assimilation in an Era of Mobilization
Political behavior in the mid- to late nineteenth century was defined by mass
political mobilization and high turnout at the polls.138 It was organized around polit-
ical parties that offered voters a service-oriented model of government in which
tangible goods were exchanged in return for political support.139 It was, as one com-
mentator described, an era when one “could smell and taste the material benefits in
politics.”140 By all accounts, immigrants learned this lesson well.141 Yet, it was for
precisely this reason that many felt the immigrants of the day were being misled in
their political assimilation.142 Indeed, many saw the machine mobilization of immi-
grants as a threat to the stability of the American political system as a whole.143
To be sure, no organization has been as successful as political machines in mak-
ing immigrants act like citizens. They “took the immigrant in charge, cared for him,
made him feel that he was a human being with distinct political rights, and converted
him into a citizen.”144 They facilitated and incentivized immigrants to participate at
the polls.145 And it was under the political machine’s tutelage that immigrants of the
nineteenth century began to think of the vote as a valuable article of exchange.146
Voting might lead to a job opportunity.147 It might mean having a friend when one
had to navigate the government bureaucracy.148 At the very least it could be traded
for a few dollars or a glass of beer on election day.149 If the goal of political assimila-
tion is to get immigrants to participate in America’s democratic process, this was a
path that immigrants understood well.150 Indeed, the turnout in many immigrant
wards outpaced those in wealthy, native-dominated wards.151
138 See generally ERIE, supra note 21, at 1–66.
139 See JONES, supra note 34, at 121.
140 See SCHUDSON, supra note 46, at 185.
141 See JONES, supra note 34, at 121; MYERS, supra note 125, at 152.
142 See JONES, supra note 34, at 121 (“[I]mmigrants were unfamiliar on arrival not only
with American political issues but with the democratic process itself. The result was that
many newcomers became tools of unscrupulous politicians.”).
143 See also JONES, supra note 34, at 121–25 (discussing how patronage-based politics and
the rise of nativism and sectional controversy undermined the American democratic notions
of freedom and liberty).
144 See MYERS, supra note 125, at 152.
145 Id. at 151–52.
146 See JONES, supra note 34, at 121.
147 See MCCAFFERY, supra note 114, at 125–26.
148 See RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE AMERICAN BALLOT BOX IN THE MID-NINETEENTH
CENTURY 84–85 (2004) (explaining that voting was often based on personal relationships and
social networks).
149 See id. at 59 (“At least a dollar was the most common sum men reported as the going
rate for votes at most precincts in the middle of the nineteenth century.”); SCHUDSON, supra
note 46, at 21–22.
150 See JONES, supra note 34, at 121.
151 Mollenkopf et al., supra note 6, at 50–51.
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Yet, in the end, it was their eagerness to participate at the polls that alarmed so
many Americans.152 More importantly, the manner in which they were getting in-
volved came to be portrayed not as evidence of their political assimilation, but rather
their inability to assimilate.153 Allegations that political machines were operating
fraudulent naturalization mills cast a pall over the votes of all immigrants.154 More-
over, the fact that they were being drawn to the polls by the promise of patronage
struck many middle and upper-class Americans as a perversion of the democratic
system.155 If anything, it was evidence that immigrants were not yet ready to be a
part of America’s political community. Of course, immigrants were hardly the only
segment of the electorate to cast their support for machine candidates, or to look for
tangible benefits in return for their political activity.156 Immigrants were an easy
target, however, and many critics of the political machines began to see the system
as an old-world import brought to the United States by the immigrants themselves.157
B. Political Suppression and the Reform City
For as long as there have been political machines, there have been municipal
reformers who opposed them.158 Indeed, for much of the nineteenth century, the com-
petition between the two came to be a defining narrative of American political life.159
To be sure, the contest appeared one-sided at the start: despite their best effort to woo
voters, reformers were only able to claim a handful of victories at the polls against
machine-backed candidates.160 By the turn of the twentieth century, however, there
were concrete signs that the reformer’s agenda was beginning to take hold.161 The
era of the reform city had begun, and with it came another major shift in the legal
and political identity of the American city.
That this urban restructuring took root at the same time as the second great wave
of immigration (from approximately 1890 to 1920) was no coincidence. Indeed, the
strong public perception that immigrants and political machines were linked proved
152 ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 66–67 (rev. ed. 2000).
153 See SUSAN WELCH & TIMOTHY BLEDSOE, URBAN REFORM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
4 (1988).
154 See ANBINDER, supra note 110, at 118.
155 See id. at 124.
156 See generally BENSEL, supra note 148.
157 See ERIE, supra note 21, at 1–2; JONES, supra note 34, at 124–25 (discussing how im-
migrant voters continued to champion European causes and that “the groups most inclined
to perpetuate Old World interests were those whom American society was most adamant
in rejecting”).
158 See BRIDGES, supra note 17, at 6–7.
159 See RAPHAEL J. SONENSHEIN, THE CITY AT STAKE: SECESSION, REFORM, AND THE
BATTLE FOR LOS ANGELES 3–4 (2004).
160 See BRIDGES, supra note 17, at 3, 9.
161 See id. at 9.
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to be a potent catalyst for the reform movement when the immigration influx re-
sumed after the Civil War.162 For the established immigrant groups of the first wave,
most notably the Irish, reform did not severely affect their political standing.163 The
“new” immigrant groups (the Italians, Jews, and Eastern Europeans concentrated on
the East Coast, along with the Mexican, Chinese, and Japanese immigrants out in the
West), however, found a political system that was not only uninterested in their vote,
but was in many ways specifically structured to discourage their participation.164
This is not to say that immigrants of the second wave were not politically active.
Many found political outlets in labor unions, churches, and civic organizations.165
In sharp contrast to their predecessors, however, they found fewer opportunities to
mobilize within the political system itself.166
1. The Reform Agenda
The municipal reform movement was both an idealistic and political endeavor.
As idealists, municipal reformers were interested in transforming the basic founda-
tion of municipal government.167 In place of politics, they sought to institute an urban
administration defined by professionalism and expertise, operated with “business-
like efficiency,” and led by the “best men.”168 As politicians and candidates, however,
the objective of municipal reformers was much more instrumental. Having suffered
many losses to machine candidates in the past, they also became fixated on eradicat-
ing machine politics as a path to reform.169 In this regard, reformers were not unlike
the political bosses that they wanted to dethrone. Both sought political advantages
where they could get them, and neither was afraid to, in Professors Amy Bridges and
Richard Kronick’s words, “write the rules to win the game.”170
162 See id. at 8 (“Municipal reformers were often politically allied with nativists. . . . [T]he
[council-manager] plan appealed to a good many people as a convenient means of putting
the Catholics, the Irish, the Italians, the labor unions, and all other ‘underdogs’ in their places.”
(quoting EDWARD C. BANFIELD & JAMES Q. WILSON, CITY POLITICS 171 (1963)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
163 Cf. WELCH & BLEDSOE, supra note 153, at 8 (noting that the reform movement had the
greatest impact in cities with “small ethnic populations” and in the West and Mid-West).
164 See Evelyn Savidge Sterne, Beyond the Boss: Immigration and American Political
Culture from 1880 to 1940, in E PLURIBUS UNUM? CONTEMPORARY AND HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON IMMIGRANT POLITICAL INCORPORATION 33, 34–39 (Gary Gerstle & John
Mollenkopf eds., 2001).
165 See id. at 34.
166 Id.
167 See BRIDGES, supra note 17, at 7.
168 See id.; MARTIN J. SCHIESL, THE POLITICS OF EFFICIENCY 8 (1977).
169 See Amy Bridges & Richard Kronick, Writing the Rules to Win the Game: The Middle-
Class Regimes of Municipal Reformers, 34 URB. AFF. REV. 691, 693 (1999).
170 Id. (“[R]eformers were able to win where they could shape the electorate by disen-
franchising their opponents . . . .”).
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These dual motivations—the transformation of urban governance and the over-
throw of the political machines—shaped the reform agenda at the turn of the twen-
tieth century. At the most basic level, reformers sought to depoliticize the process
by which local leaders were selected.171 To this end, they advocated the elimination
of ward representation in favor of city-wide elections so that the “best” candidate
could be selected.172 They also advocated for nonpartisan ballots to reduce the in-
fluence of political parties on the voting process.173 In addition, reformers took steps
to eliminate patronage as a means of rewarding supporters.174 They proposed civil
service requirements so that merit, rather than political loyalties, would be the basis
on which municipal employees were selected.175 They also urged competitive bidding
for city contracts so that competence and value, rather than political connections,
would be the basis on which municipal projects were awarded.176 All of this was
“aimed at breaking the ties of voter to officeholder.”177
The reform movement’s grandest vision, however, was to reimagine the basic
structure of local governments altogether.178 In short, they wanted to throw out the
mayor-council system, which they thought was too politically motivated, for entirely
new administrative structures that would be more insulated from political demands
and pressures.179 A natural disaster gave the reform movement a significant boost in
this endeavor. After it was destroyed by a hurricane in 1901, the city of Galveston,
Texas, adopted a model of government run by commissioners, each in charge of a
different municipal department. The commissioners’ success in rebuilding the city
and reforming its government brought it national attention as a model of reform.180
Following this, reformers pushed for all cities to adopt its “commission” form of
government.181 Later, when dissatisfaction with the commission model began to
mount, reformers urged the adoption of the council-manager model, in which an
elected city council “hires” a city manager (in place of a mayor) to run the day-to-
day operations of the city.182
Reformers never had much success in attracting voter support in an era of mass
political mobilization.183 This was especially true in the big machine cities of the
171 See WELCH & BLEDSOE, supra note 153, at 6–7.
172 See id. at 7–8.
173 See id. at 7.
174 See SCHIESL, supra note 168, at 29–33.
175 See id. at 31–32.
176 See id. at 106.
177 BRIDGES, supra note 17, at 58.
178 See id.
179 See id. at 58–59.
180 Id. at 57.
181 See id.
182 See SCHIESL, supra note 168, at 172–73.
183 BRIDGES, supra note 17, at 3, 9.
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Northeast where the municipal reform movement first got its start.184 Yet by the
early twentieth century, reformers could point to a number of developments in their
favor. Poll restrictions and electoral reform were dampening the mobilization fervor
that characterized the nineteenth century.185 State-appointed officials and non-political
public authorities were assuming more prominent roles in various aspects of muni-
cipal administration, bypassing the local political leadership.186 Reformers were able
to implement these changes by going directly to the state level, where the political
leadership might be more conducive to their cause.187 As a result, the reform era
witnessed a dramatic recalibration of the relationship between state and local gov-
ernments.188 One example was the Massachusetts takeover of the Boston police
department in 1885.189 Though sold as an effort to reduce corruption, it was widely
understood to be a strategic move by the native-controlled Republican statehouse
to wrest control of a powerful institution (and a large source of patronage jobs) from
the increasingly Irish-controlled Democratic city.190
These and other reforms made patronage operations more difficult in established
machine cities.191 They also changed the political culture in important ways.192 For
the most part, however, reformers were never able to topple the dominance of es-
tablished machines outright in certain northern cities, much less effectuate the kind
of broad-based structural reforms that they proposed.193 Although reformers never
achieved the level of success that they desired in the machine-dominated cities like
New York and Chicago, it was an entirely different story in the newer cities in the
South and the Southwest.194 In cities like Houston, Dallas, Phoenix, and San Diego,
municipal reformers got everything that they wanted.195 Cities in these regions were
among the first to adopt the “commission,” and later the “manager” forms of gov-
ernment touted by municipal reformers.196 Reform-minded candidates were also
184 See id. at 6–7.
185 See PIVENS & CLOWARD, supra note 78, at 78.
186 See id. at 77–78 (“[M]any smaller municipalities whose machine leaders carried less
weight in state governments were simply put under the control of ‘expert’ city managers or
commission forms of government . . . .”).
187 See id. at 77.
188 See id.
189 See JACK TAGER, BOSTON RIOTS 157 (2001) (explaining that the Massachusetts legisla-
ture’s new charter for Boston took away the mayor’s power to appoint the police commissioner).
190 Id.
191 See PIVENS & CLOWARD, supra note 78, at 78.
192 See id. at 81 (explaining that parties were weakened particularly in their ability to reach
and mobilize voters, which resulted in an “erosion of party-line voting”).
193 BRIDGES, supra 17, at 69.
194 See id. at 5–6, 65–69.
195 See id.
196 See supra text accompanying notes 179–82 (discussing Galveston, Texas, and its early
commission-run government).
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able to dominate local political power in ways that the machines were never able to
achieve.197 In addition, they all shared certain “distinguishing characteristics” when
the reform process was complete: “very low participation, rhetorical narrowness, lack
of competition at the polls, government by men who claimed to be civic statesmen
rather than politicians, and carefully targeted distribution of limited amenities.”198
This was possible because the most significant opponents of reform—political
machines and the immigrants they mobilized—were never as numerous or organized
in the new cities of the Southwestern frontier as they were in the established East
Coast cities.199 Moreover, at the time that these cities made this transition, none of
them were considered major cities,200 which is why many early scholars of the munici-
pal reform movement ignored them at first. In the years since, however, the national
standing of reform cities like Houston, Phoenix, and others along the so-called
“Sunbelt” could not be more different: they are among some of the largest and
fastest-growing cities in the United States.201 In addition, for our purposes, they are
hosts to a significant proportion of the immigrants living in the United States today.202
2. Reform and the Second Great Wave of Immigration
The second great wave of immigration from 1890 to 1920 coincided with the rise
of the municipal reform movement.203 How did these two developments interact? As
a matter of principle, there was no reason that reformers needed to align themselves
against immigrants or immigration.204 Indeed, the social reformers’ call for good
government was directed as much towards the betterment and welfare of the city’s
foreign-born population as it was for the sake of its native residents.205 In the words
of one New York reformer: the goal of reform was a municipal government that was
197 See id. at 5, 65–67.
198 See id. at 210.
199 See Martin Shefter, Regional Receptivity to Reform: The Legacy of the Progressive
Era, 98 POL. SCI. Q. 459, 459–60, 476 (1983) (explaining why political machines played a
larger role in politics in East Coast cities and why the reform movement found more support
among immigrants in the West).
200 See BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 5.
201 See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Texas Dominates List of Fastest-Growing Large
Cities Since 2010 Census, Census Bureau Reports (June 28, 2012), http://www.census.gov
/newsroom/releases/archives/population/cb12-117.html.
202 See Audrey Singer, The Rise of New Immigrant Gateways, in 2 REDEFINING URBAN
AND SUBURBAN AMERICA: EVIDENCE FROM CENSUS 2000, at 41 (Alan Berube et al. eds., 2005).
203 See WELCH & BLEDSOE, supra note 153, at 4–5; see also JONES, supra note 34, at 152–56.
204 See Sterne, supra note 164, at 43 (explaining that “the machine was far less powerful
than it seemed as an institution that incorporated immigrants” because a number of “ethnic
leaders” opposed the machines and only a minority of immigrants voted).
205 See WELCH & BLEDSOE, supra note 153, at 4 (distinguishing social and structural
reformers).
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not only responsive to those “who live above Fourteenth Street,” but also to “the
Italian of the ‘Bend’ and of ‘Little Italy,’ the Chinaman of Mott Street, the Jew of
Hester Street, and the African of Thompson Street.”206
Yet, the strong tie that was established between political machines and the immi-
grant vote during the first great wave of immigration continued to frame the thinking
of most reformers during the second wave.207 This was so even though, as we will see
below, the political bond between old immigrant machines and newer immigrant
voters was never actually all that clear.208 In the reformers’ minds, however, the gen-
eral welfare of the city and all its residents would best be served by disentangling all
immigrants from the political process altogether.209 As such, reformers set out to
suppress the immigrant vote.210
Part of this effort involved enforcing limitations that were already in place. For
example, in response to allegations that political machines like Tammany were fraud-
ulently naturalizing immigrants through their control of the local judiciary, reformers
successfully pushed for the federal government to centralize the naturalization pro-
cess on the belief that federal judges would be less prone to corruption.211 Another
part of this effort focused on imposing new restrictions to filter out immigrant (and
other undesirable) voters, the central component of which was the literacy test.212
Many states like Massachusetts had already implemented some kind of literacy re-
quirement for voting during the apex of the nativist Know-Nothing movement in the
1850s.213 By the early twentieth century, however, more rigorous literacy examina-
tions were proposed (requiring English literacy and not just any literacy), and states
that had resisted such restrictions in the past began to adopt them as well.214 Immi-
grant voters and the political organizations that depended on them mounted strong op-
position to these and other new voting requirements.215 Reformers, however, were able
to exploit the concentrated nature of immigrant political power to their advantage.
206 See WILLIAM HOWE TOLMAN, MUNICIPAL REFORM MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
27 (1895); see also PAUL BOYER, URBAN MASSES AND MORAL ORDER IN AMERICA, 1820–1920
173 (1978).
207 See BRIDGES, supra note 17, at 8–9.
208 See ERIE, supra note 21, at 6–7 (noting that the Irish-dominated political machines had nei-
ther the resources nor the desire to incorporate, naturalize, or register later waves of immigrants).
209 See BRIDGES, supra note 17, at 8.
210 See id. (“[R]eformers and nativists proposed voter registration, literacy testing, extend-
ing the residency period required for voting, and the poll tax.”).
211 See LOUIS DESIPIO, COUNTING ON THE LATINO VOTE 145 (1998) (explaining that the
Bureau of Naturalization was created in 1907).
212 See id. at 144–45 (describing Congress’s 1906 requirement that applicants for naturali-
zation speak English); KEYSSAR, supra note 152, at 117 (noting that by the mid-1920s more
than a dozen states disenfranchised illiterate people who were otherwise eligible to vote).
213 See ANBINDER, supra note 110, at 138–39.
214 See KEYSSAR, supra note 152, at 116–17.
215 Id.
2012] URBAN POLITICS AND THE ASSIMILATION OF IMMIGRANT VOTERS 675
Knowing that they could not always prevail at the local level, reformers turned to
the state and federal level where immigrant political influence was weaker.216
Voter suppression was not the only major component of the reform agenda. It
also gave rise to further structural reforms. As Amy Bridges and Richard Kronick
argue, reformers were successful in restructuring Southwestern cities because they
had already reshaped the electorate in those states to disenfranchise those who would
be most likely to oppose to municipal reform.217 And just as it was in the East, the
target was often the newest immigrants, which included Hispanics and Asians in the
West.218 As Bridges and Kronick note, electoral reform came before, and not as a
part of, the success of municipal reforms.219 Political turnout was already low in the
Southwestern cities when reform charter proposals were placed on the ballot.220
Even though the reformers were ultimately unable to defeat the established po-
litical machines of the Northeast in the same way that they conquered the Southwest,
the strategy of the established political machines came to resemble that of the re-
formers. As Professor Steven Erie argues in his reexamination of Irish political
machines, many of the reform strategies designed to cripple machine politics were
actually adopted by the machines themselves.221 They did so in large part to avoid hav-
ing to meet the demands of the immigrants of the second wave.222 Patronage politics
is expensive, and there is only a limited pool of municipal goods to go around.223
Having already secured a solid political base that expected to be recipients of pa-
tronage goods, machines reoriented their strategy towards voter suppression and
elite politics in the same way that the reformers advocated.224 In other words, ma-
chines entered a maintenance phase, more intent on preserving the status quo rather
than recruiting new supporters.225
Not unlike the reformers, the early twentieth century political machine focused
less on mobilization and more on suppression.226 Gone were the efforts to naturalize,
register, or turnout the immigrant vote.227 This shift allowed the existing political ma-
chines to keep the limited patronage that remained within their established base.228
216 See DESIPIO, supra note 211, at 145 (discussing the “disparate practices” at the local
level and the success of naturalization reform at the federal level).
217 See Bridges & Kronick, supra note 169, at 693 (“Municipal reformers were successful
where they could write the rules to win the game.”).
218 See id. at 698.
219 Id. at 693.
220 See id. at 701.
221 See ERIE, supra note 21, at 11–13 (detailing Tammany’s voter repression scheme and
refusal to assist new waves of immigrants with naturalization and registration).
222 See id. at 10, 12–13.
223 See id. at 9–13.
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225 See id. at 9–12.
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227 See id. at 11, 97.
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Many of the reform efforts actually assisted the machines in their restructuring.229
For example, as Professor Roger Waldinger pointed out, because the new immi-
grants from eastern and southern Europe had “little chance of doing well in essay-
type exams against the Irish, who were, after all, native English speakers. . . . [T]he
introduction of a civil service system had the opposite of its intended effect—
increasing the opportunities for the Irish.”230
Of course, it must be noted that there is a certain degree of irony to the re-
former’s opposition to the “new” immigrants of the second wave. Reformers sought
to weaken the urban political machines by imposing obstacles to the immigrants’
political participation.231 Yet, unbeknownst to them at the time, some of their most
significant victories against the established political machines would be on the backs
of the Italians, Jews, and new immigrant groups that the political machines began
to neglect.232 For example, the election of reform-minded Fiorello LaGuardia as
Mayor of New York in 1934 marked the beginning of the end for the city’s famed
Tammany Hall. This victory was possible in large part because LaGuardia appealed
to and won the political support of the Italians and Jews who had been excluded
from Tammany’s organizing efforts.233 Had Tammany been more attentive to the
new immigrants, as was the case in Chicago,234 it might have survived into the mid-
twentieth century. Or if the reformers had mobilized the new immigrants earlier,
instead of working to suppress their political influence, such a victory might have
come a lot sooner.
3. Political Assimilation in an Era of Suppression
Much like the political machines that they opposed, municipal reformers were
deeply interested in the political assimilation of immigrants.235 The model of political
assimilation that they presented to immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century,
however, could not have been more different than what the machines presented to
their predecessors: “The model citizen, in the reform vision, would be disciplined
enough to register, educated enough to read, thinking enough to choose candidates with
little or no party guidance, and docile enough to leave many matters to the experts.”236
This was a threshold of political assimilation that many immigrants would even-
tually reach.237 Yet, it was not one that could easily have been met by simply living in
229 See WALDINGER, supra note 100, at 209.
230 See id.
231 See BRIDGES, supra note 17, at 8.
232 See ERIE, supra note 21, at 12.
233 See id.
234 See id.
235 See SCHUDSON, supra note 46, at 182–85.
236 Id. at 185.
237 See generally JONES, supra note 34.
2012] URBAN POLITICS AND THE ASSIMILATION OF IMMIGRANT VOTERS 677
the United States for five years and demonstrating proficiency in English—the stan-
dard for naturalization at the time.238 When it came to immigration, the goal of
municipal reformers was not to parrot the federal standards.239 Rather, in their own
way, they sought to shape them. What emerged was not only a different way of
thinking about American citizenship, but also a new way of measuring immigrant
assimilation.240 In the reformer’s mind, they were doing this to “benefit American
society as well as immigrants themselves.”241
Eventually, the belief that immigrants were to blame for the sorry state of urban
governance (and the moral decay of the city as a whole) became a powerful impetus
for more stringent naturalization controls.242 In this regard, measures initially imple-
mented as municipal reforms came to serve as the model for federal immigration
laws.243 It is no coincidence, for example, that after many states adopted literacy re-
quirements for the vote, Congress debated and eventually enacted a literacy require-
ment for immigration and an English literacy requirement for naturalization.244 Nor
should it be surprising that “the founding of the Immigration Restriction League in
1894,” which proposed the literacy requirement and advocated for more stringent im-
migration reforms, “coincided almost perfectly with the time when the old Yankees
began to lose their grip on northeastern cities, places they’d regarded as theirs by
birthright for 250 years.”245
C. Political Isolation and the Fragmented City
With the liberalization of immigration laws in 1965, immigration is once again
reshaping the political demographic of urban America.246 Yet, thus far, more recent
immigrants have had far less political impact than their numbers would suggest.247
There are few signs of any meaningful political mobilizations.248 Indeed, more than
any other segment of the American electorate, immigrants are least likely to have
any political affiliation at all.249 It has become commonplace to blame this on the
238 See Louis DeSipio & Harry Pachon, Making Americans: Administrative Discretion and
Americanization, 12 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 52, 52 (1992).
239 See id.
240 See id. at 116 (“[L]iteracy was essential for the foreign-born to become properly ac-
quainted with American values and institutions.”).
241 See id. at 116.
242 See id. at 66–67.
243 See SCHRAG, supra note 35, at 108.
244 See ERIE, supra note 21, at 92–93. For a discussion on the enactment of the federal
literacy test, see DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES 141 (2002).
245 See SCHRAG, supra note 35, at 48.
246 See ZOLTAN L. HAJNAL & TAEKU LEE, WHY AMERICANS DON’T JOIN THE PARTY 8–9
(2011).
247 See id. at 152.
248 See id. at 150.
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immigrants themselves, especially their lack of familiarity with democratic politics.250
Yet, as some scholars are pointing out, many immigrant groups actually come from
countries in which the political culture is more vibrant than that of the present-day
United States and is, in fact, a scene more reminiscent of our own era of mass mobi-
lization.251 Why then, upon arriving, do these immigrants seem so uninterested in
political participation, especially at the local level where they are capable of making
a significant impact?
One reason for this, I argue, is the political fragmentation of urban political
power today. Whereas a single city government might have controlled the vast ma-
jority of an urbanized area in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the met-
ropolitan areas of today are governed by a long list of independent and politically
isolated local governments—the city, suburbs, towns, and sometimes villages.252
This fragments the political power of immigrant groups, and obstructs the kind of
broad-based political organization that is often necessary to exercise political in-
fluence. It also isolates the political power of immigrants who manage to gain
control over a local government jurisdiction. Like the political mobilization of the
mid-nineteenth century and the voter suppression of the early twentieth century, this
too has been an effective means of managing the potential political power of im-
migrant newcomers.
1. The Political Landscape of Fragmentation
Commenting on the lack of political participation at the turn of the twenty-first
century, Professor Arthur Meier Schlesinger asked: “What has happened to the Ameri-
can as political animal?”253 Turnout for presidential elections has dropped to new lows
in the last few decades, sometimes drawing a little more than half of eligible voters.254
The figure is even worse in local elections, where it is not uncommon for a quarter or
less of the electorate to participate at the polls.255 It is not that local issues are no longer
important. Even in an era of globalization, people are still intensely concerned about
their immediate community—from local job conditions to the state of public schools.256
250 See MICHAEL JONES-CORREA, BETWEEN TWO NATIONS 88–89 (1998).
251 See CAROL HARDY-FANTA, LATINA POLITICS, LATINO POLITICS 178 (1993).
252 See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 77 (1990).
253 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 256 (1986).
254 See id.; John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections:
1828–2008, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/turnout.php
(last visited Dec. 6, 2012).
255 See Zoltan L. Hajnal & Paul G. Lewis, Municipal Institutions and Voter Turnout in
Local Elections, 38 URB. AFF. REV. 645, 645–46 (2003).
256 See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 4 (2001) (positing that home-
owners care about how local conditions impact the value of their property and therefore follow
local issues closely).
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The difference is that most people today do not think that any meaningful difference
can be made through local politics.257
This state of affairs is not inherent to the nature of local government. Rather, it
is the product of layers of policy choices and structural reforms that have taken place
in the past.258 In today’s local political structure, we see signs of the old machine
city.259 Though few political machines operate today, most local jurisdictions are
dominated by political parties with little or no political competition, thus little need
for political mobilization.260 At the same time, there are also traces of the reform
city. There are more city managers in the United States than mayors.261 We are also
more likely to talk about the “business” of running a city rather than the politics.262
Both of these models continue to shape the structure of local governments, and
through that, local political participation. If there is one distinguishing feature of
local politics today, however, it is its fragmentation. And the biggest consequence
of this is the lack of any meaningful local political power.263 The machine and the
reform models imagined cities being run in different ways, by different people, and
for different purposes.264 But both imagine the city as centralized and a powerful
institution, capable of shaping the destiny of urban America. In the metropolitan
areas of today, however, this is no longer true. The city now is often but a single
political community in a sea of independent local jurisdictions.265 This urban land-
scape is further overlaid by a proliferation of public authorities and special districts,
each beholden to a different constituency (or none at all) and acting independently
of one another.266
People often complain about the tremendous local authority (sometimes known
as “home rule”) that local communities possess today.267 Yet, the most direct effect
of this political fragmentation has actually been to increase the powerlessness of each
local government.268 Most local issues today concern social and economic develop-
ments happening region-wide.269 As such, whether we are talking about crime, poverty,
257 See MARK LAWRENCE KORNBLUH, WHY AMERICA STOPPED VOTING 160 (2000) (arguing
that elections lost their significance when politics came to be dominated by deep-pocketed spe-
cial interest groups).
258 See id. at 154–56.
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260 See id. at 73.
261 See FISCHEL, supra note 256, at 23 (citing Tari Renner & Victor DeSantis, Municipal
Form of Government: Issues and Trends, in THE MUNICIPAL YEARBOOK 1998, at 32 (1998)).
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segregation, or local tax revenue, the fate of most local communities are often tied
up with the policy choices being made in other communities, over which they have
no direct control and no effective means of influencing.270
All of this has changed the structure and incentives of urban politics—not only
for the political establishment, but also for the individual voters. First, political frag-
mentation has dramatically increased the importance of line-drawing in constructing
political victories.271 Thanks to redistricting, most political contests today are won
before any campaigning actually starts.272 Self-sorting of American residents into
distinct neighborhoods of shared interest has made it easier to calculate and predict
the political behavior of likely voters long before they actually step into the polls.273
This has allowed political parties to establish more sophisticated strategies on where
to focus their attention and resources.274 In addition, it has given increased signifi-
cance to where jurisdictional lines are drawn.275 This is why the start of every decade
is filled with fierce political contests over redistricting; the boundary lines that are
produced usually determine the overall balance of political power for the rest of the
decade.276 It also means that political parties have little incentive to mobilize or
change the voting behavior of the electorate in a significant manner. Being able to
accurately calculate and predict voting behavior is, in many cases, more valuable.
Nor are the stakes associated with local politics the same in an era of political
fragmentation. The truth is, although we care about local issues, most of us know
that our local representatives are simply in no position to impact them.277 To be sure,
ideological issues can still mobilize people to the polls. But in terms of substantive
outcomes, most find local political participation to be relatively pointless.278 Indeed,
this is a significant reason that African American groups’ efforts to resurrect machine
270 See id.
271 See DESIPIO, supra note 211, at 97.
272 See Matthew Pierce, Redistricting Roulette-Wheel, FAIR VOTE: THE CENTER FOR
VOTING AND DEMOCRACY, http://www.fairvote.org/redistricting-roulette-wheel (last visited
Dec. 6, 2012).
273 See BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT 42–47 (Mariner Books 2009) (2008) (describing
Americans’ tendency to self-sort residentially according to party affiliation).
274 See, e.g., Mike Riopell, Absent from Convention, Schneider ‘Focused on the District,’
DAILY HERALD, Sept. 6, 2012, http://www.dailyherald.com/article/20120906/news/709069554/.
275 See Charles S. Bullock, Redistricting: Racial and Partisan Concerns, in LAW AND
ELECTION POLITICS: THE RULES OF THE GAME 151 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2005); Voting
Rights and Voting Wrongs: An Interview with Lani Guinier, MASS. HUMANITIES (Spring 2006),
http://www.masshumanities.org/index.php?p=s06_vrvw&searchlight=voting%20rights%20and
%20voting%20wrongs.
276 See generally Bullock, supra note 275, at 1–69 (discussing redistricting controversies).
277 See supra text accompanying notes 265–70 (discussing the ineffectiveness of local gov-
ernments in the face of regional issues).
278 See Hajnal & Lewis, supra note 255, at 647 (explaining the correlation between voter
turnout and voters’ perception of the structure of local government).
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politics in the 1970s and 1980s failed.279 Having finally succeeded in securing po-
litical power in the cities, the political leadership found that there simply was not that
much power or resources there, much less enough to sustain a meaningful patronage
operation.280 The base of urban political power today is metropolitan in scope.281 The
fragmentation of the urban political structure, however, ensures that there is no ac-
cess to that base through local politics.
If there is less incentive to vote at the local ballot box today, there is neverthe-
less a political strategy that works well in an era of political fragmentation: voting
with one’s feet. In other words, the diversity of independent local jurisdictions that
are available means that none of them have that much fate over their future or that
of the metropolitan region as a whole.282 Nevertheless, significant policy changes—a
different tax rate, a higher or lower level of public services—can still be gained by
moving from one community to the next.283 Thus, for the individual resident, mobility
is often the primary means of effectuating political changes.
2. Immigrants in the Fragmented City
How is the fragmented urban political system of today responding to the influx
of immigrants today? The short answer is that it is not. There appears to be no signi-
ficant effort among existing political parties to mobilize immigrants, much less nat-
uralize them as voters.284 There is not even the same degree of care being put into
suppressing their political participation, especially in comparison to the reformers’
response at the turn of the twentieth century.285 This does not mean that there is not
a lot of talk about immigrant political power.286 Yet, it appears that as little as pos-
sible is actually being done among the parties to influence their voting practices (or
lack thereof).287 Given the potential impact of the Hispanic and Asian vote, this seems
to be a grievous oversight.288 Yet, as we will see, this non-response actually fits the
logic and incentives of political fragmentation quite well.
What are the consequences of this political neglect? One is that many immi-
grants today are simply not voting.289 Admittedly, interest in voting in the United
279 See ERIE, supra note 21, at 260, 264–66.
280 See id. at 259–60.
281 See id. at 262 (noting that “urban politics has been nationalized”).
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284 See Kristi Anderson, Parties, Operations, and Political Incorporation: Immigrants in
Six U.S. Cities, in CIVIC HOPES AND POLITICAL REALITIES 77, 88 (S. Karthick Ramakrishnan
& Irene Bloemraad eds., 2008).
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States has fallen across the board.290 Among the newest Americans, however, the fig-
ure is even worse.291 The growth of the Hispanic and Asian populations through im-
migration is one of the largest demographic shifts we have seen in recent decades.292
Yet neither of these groups participates at the polls anywhere near the rate of Cau-
casians or African Americans.293 Most Hispanics are slow to naturalize, and even after
they do, only about half actually vote.294 Asians show a slightly higher rate of nat-
uralization, but a smaller percentage of citizens actually register to vote.295
Even more surprising than their voting behavior is that immigrants today have
little sense of their political identity. When asked about their party identification, the
category that received the most responses among Hispanics and Asians was not Repub-
lican, Democrat, or even Independent.296 Instead, by a whopping 38% among Latinos
and 36% among Asians, the most popular was what is often referred to as a “non-
compliant” category: “no preference,” “none,” “neither,” “other,” “don’t know.”297
Not only are immigrants today less likely to participate in the formal political
process, they are also less likely than their predecessors to be involved in other
outlets of political activity. If labor unions, churches, and other voluntary organi-
zations played an important role in the political activism of the second wave of
immigrants, they play a much smaller role today.298 This is not to say that other or-
ganizations have not emerged to fill the gap.299 Yet, as Kristi Anderson notes, they
tend to be single-issue outfits with limited scope and much more restricted access
to institutions of political power.300
This may appear at first to present a wonderful opportunity for political entrepre-
neurs. Indeed, every political cycle we are reminded of the impact that this “sleeping
giant” can have on electoral outcomes if it can only be awakened.301 Most studies
focused at the local level where political mobilization efforts are ordinarily centered,
however, find that there is little enthusiasm in recruiting immigrant supporters.302
This is even the case in urban neighborhoods that still retain remnants of the old po-
litical machines.303 For example, in his analysis of the democratic organization in
Queens, New York, Professor Michael Jones-Correa found that political elites were
290 See SCHLESINGER, supra note 253, at 256.
291 See id. at 257.
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not only slow to reach out to the fast-growing immigrant population in their bor-
ough, but at times worked actively to discourage their participation in order to
maintain the political status quo.304
It is easy to blame immigrants for their political apathy, just as it is convenient
to blame parties for not fulfilling their role as electoral organizers. But in an era of
political fragmentation, this behavior can be understood to be a rational response to
the political structure that they face. For immigrant groups that find themselves in
a position to influence or dominate local elections, there are increasingly fewer rea-
sons to do so. Residential sorting along lines of race, class, and ideology has rendered
most local elections noncompetitive (even for state or national offices).305 At the
same time, in an era of political fragmentation, control of local governments offers
few of the benefits and opportunities that would have been available in both the
machine and reform eras. Too much of the fate of a local community lies in the pol-
icies of its neighbors, over which it has no formal control, or even an institutional
means of influencing indirectly.
If the current political structure offers little incentive for immigrants to partici-
pate at the local level, it also does not provide much to the political parties to moti-
vate them. There is a certain kind of elegance to how political fragmentation divides
and classifies the urban electorate. Self-sorting over the years has made it much
easier to predict local electoral outcomes, which enables modern political parties to
allocate their limited resources in strategic ways. It has also made it easier to draw
electoral lines, which is now how most state and federal offices are won.306 An
aggressive immigrant mobilization effort might make some local jurisdiction or
electoral districts more competitive. But the resources required to do so, combined
with the uncertain outcome, make such efforts unlikely in today’s fragmented po-
litical structure.307 Currently, the political behavior of immigrant groups is a known
element—easily predicted and conveniently segmented. With the exception of maybe
a presidential or state-wide senate election, there is little incentive for any of the
parties to alter that behavior.
3. Political Assimilation in an Era of Political Fragmentation
If neither immigrants nor the urban political system are responding to one
another in any meaningful way, then what model of immigrant political assimilation
304 See id. at 82–87.
305 See BISHOP, supra note 273, at 8–15 (describing a nationwide trend of people moving to
counties where they share the social and political views of the majority of the other residents);
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does it portray? For immigrants who find themselves in a fragmented urban environ-
ment, like the ones that characterize nearly all of America’s metropolitan regions,
what, if anything, are they learning about political citizenship in the twenty-first
century? At first blush, it may appear that they are learning nothing at all. The low
rate of political participation and declining confidence in governments among all
Americans seem to suggest that any ideal model of political citizenship that we may
have held is fast disappearing.308 If anything, it can be argued that immigrants are
assimilating America’s newfound political apathy quite well by avoiding any polit-
ical identification and staying away from the polls.
Yet, politics in a fragmented political system is not without its own logic and set
of incentives, and those appear to be what immigrants are learning. If they are not
necessarily getting involved in local political contests, immigrants are nevertheless
internalizing well the twentieth-century American tradition of voting with one’s feet.
In recent years, immigrants have followed the footsteps of native-born Americans
by moving into the suburbs.309 Indeed, the suburbanization of the immigrant popu-
lation, which since 2000 accounts for more than half the foreign-born population in
the United States, is one of the biggest demographic trends in the immigrant com-
munity.310 By moving to the suburbs many immigrants have been able to find gov-
ernments with packages of policies and services that are better suited to their needs
in a shorter time and with less effort than through political activism.311
But adopting the political model of the mobile citizen also has risks in a frag-
mented political structure. On the one hand, suburbanization for some immigrants
has only brought about further political isolation, as they move into communities that
may have even less power or resources to manage the needs of immigrant residents.312
On the other hand, conflicts between immigrants and natives that might have in the
past been dealt with at the ballot box or in legislative negotiations are increasingly
being waged today at the boundaries of local communities.313 In other words, while
there is little concern about there being too many immigrants in New York City, there
has been explosive and sometimes violent conflict when immigrants have sought to
become residents of communities like Farmingville in Long Island,314 or those even
308 See Hajnal & Lewis, supra note 255, at 646.
309 ROBERTO SURO ET AL., METROPOLITAN POL’Y PROGRAM AT BROOKINGS, IMMIGRATION
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further out in the Hamptons.315 It is not that these communities are not used to hav-
ing immigrants around; many immigrants are moving out there to be closer to jobs
that they have long worked.316 Rather, the controversy arises from immigrants being
neighbors and residents and thus formally part of these isolated and independent
political communities.317 If mobility is politics in an era of political fragmentation,
then it makes sense that the boundary of political communities would be where the
conflicts between immigrants and natives would be settled today.
III. LESSONS ON IMMIGRANT POLITICAL ASSIMILATION
As we have seen, the relationship between immigrant political participation and
urban political structures is multifaceted. It is the political system that most immi-
grants encounter first, and as such, it plays an important role in molding their early
political behavior. It has also been an effective means by which the United States,
as a nation, has sought to manage the political impact of large immigrant influxes.318
In each of the different eras of urban politics, immigrants were faced with a different
set of political incentives and a different model of political assimilation. At the most
basic level, this examination reveals the historical bonds between urban politics
and immigrant politics.319 This Part offers some additional thoughts on what this
history tells us about citizenship, immigration policymaking, and conditions for
political participation.
A. Fellow Citizens, Political Rivals
Among immigration scholars today, there is a lot of interest in drawing out the
affiliation and ties that immigrants have with the United States.320 Citizenship holds
315 See Elizabeth A. Harris, Tension for East Hampton as Immigrants Stream In, N.Y.
TIMES, July 3, 2012, at A19.
316 See Eltman, supra note 314; Harris, supra note 315.
317 See Harris, supra note 315.
318 See JONES-CORREA, supra note 250, at 69.
319 See generally ALLSWANG, supra note 62, at 41 (discussing the urban political ma-
chines); ERIE, supra note 21, at 19–23 (discussing the history of the urban political machines).
320 See generally TOMÁS R. JIMÉNEZ, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 1 (May 2011) (finding that recent immigrants are “integrating reasonably well” based
on a study of “five main indicators: language proficiency, socioeconomic attainment, polit-
ical participation, residential locale, and social interaction with host communities”); MADELEINE
SUMPTION & SARAH FLAMM, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF CITIZENSHIP
FOR IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2012) (analyzing why naturalized citizens are more
successful in the U.S. labor market than noncitizens and advocating for naturalization as a
tool to increase immigrants’ integration and their wages); Lauren Gilbert, National Identity
and Immigration Policy in the U.S. and the European Union, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 99 (2007)
(comparing efforts in the United States and the European Union to reform immigration laws
and integrate noncitizens); Laureen Laglagaron & Bhavna Devani, Migration Pol’y Inst., The
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a vaunted position in these efforts because it is often portrayed as the finish line, an
end goal.321 Given the tremendous number of undocumented immigrants in the United
States today, this perspective makes sense; for many immigrants, citizenship or even
a path to citizenship dramatically elevates their legal standing in American society.322
Citizenship confers rights. Citizenship grants protections. Citizenship signifies be-
longing. From a legal perspective then, citizenship is what transforms an “alien” into
a full member of the national polity.
The fierce political competition between immigrants and natives throughout
American history, however, reminds us that citizenship itself can be a source of
conflict.323 Politics is often portrayed as civic engagement among equals. In reality,
however, it is often waged like a battle in which all sides are looking for a political
advantage. In most cases, any shift in the balance of power comes on gradually. In
eras of mass immigration, however, the possibility of radical restructuring is greatly
increased by the potential to capitalize on new voters.324 For some in the political
game, this offers an incredible opportunity—it is no coincidence that both the rise
and fall of the political machine occurred during periods of mass immigration.325 For
others, the formal admission of immigrants into the political process is a great source
of apprehension, even more so than their initial presence in this country.326 The short-
lived Know-Nothing Party of the nineteenth century is still well-known for their fierce
nativism.327 Less well-known is the fact that they never sought any quotas or restric-
tions on immigration.328 Instead, their focus was entirely on mitigating the political
impact of the newcomers.329 In short, immigrant citizens are sometimes rivals in
ways that immigrant aliens are not.
Redesigned Citizenship Test, 6 MPI BACKGROUNDER (Sept. 2008) (examining the new citi-
zenship test implemented by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, which was created
with the goal of having a test that was more “meaningful” to applicants for naturalization and
which features an expanded civics portion); Cristina M. Rodríguez, Language and Partici-
pation, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 687 (2006) (arguing that embracing multilingualism in American
society may require that we change our understanding of assimilation but will not threaten
our democracy); Ashley Pettus, End of the Melting Pot?, HARV. MAG. 44 (May–June 2007)
(reviewing research on immigration by various Harvard scholars and expressing concern that
economic and social factors make it less likely that today’s immigrants will assimilate with
same rate of success as immigrants in the late nineteenth century).
321 See Cox & Posner, supra note 20, at 1413.
322 See id. at 1411–12.
323 See generally SCHRAG, supra note 35 (illustrating political competition and conflict
between immigrants and natives in American history).
324 See Mollenkopf et al., supra note 6 (noting that immigrant voters mobilized by machine
politics had higher voter turnout than native voters); Singer, supra note 202, at 41.
325 See WELCH & BLEDSOE, supra note 153, at 2.
326 See KEYSSAR, supra note 152, at 67.
327 See id. at 66–67.
328 See ANBINDER, supra note 110, at 106.
329 See KEYSSAR, supra note 152, at 166.
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B. Negotiating Immigration Policymaking
While many are focusing on how perceptions about membership and belonging
shape our nation’s approach to immigration, others are adding more depth to the
classic “contractual model” of immigration policymaking.330 Taking as their foun-
dation that immigration policies are best understood as “contracts” reached between
a host country and aspiring immigrants, Professors Adam Cox and Eric Posner have
begun to outline the different incentives and specific mechanisms through which these
deals are reached, amended, and enforced.331 Two significant insights have emerged
from this line of research. The first is an appreciation of the delicate balance that the
immigration system has to strike between the interests of the immigrants that the host
country wants to attract and the risks that the host country assumes in doing so.332
The second is the importance of flexible and adaptive mechanisms that can deal with
informational deficiencies and hidden costs.333
Much has been said about how the structure of federal immigration laws has
been shaped by these principles.334 Yet, as our examination of urban political struc-
tures shows, we need to look beyond the federal if we are to truly understand how
the interests of immigrants and the host nation are actually negotiated on the ground.
There is arguably no more significant a risk in immigration than to grant immigrants
the right to vote, especially (as usually is the case) when there is little assurance that
the political demands of immigrants are similar to that of natives. Yet, while our
nation’s naturalization laws have remained relatively stable,335 a host of different
institutional strategies were developed to negotiate the political power of immi-
grants. In the nineteenth century, they were coopted into political machines that frus-
trated many in the political establishment, but also had the effect of “insulat[ing]
American elites by managing and deflecting mass pressures”336 and thus preserving
much of the status quo.337 At the turn of the twentieth century, the urban political
structure was transformed so that the political demands of immigrants were sup-
pressed and then redirected to other channels.338 Today, little effort is made to sup-
press immigrant political participation;339 but by isolating the scope of their political
330 For a discussion and critique of the “contractual mode,” see HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
AMERICANS IN WAITING 26–37 (2006).
331 See Cox & Posner, supra note 20, at 1405–10.
332 See id. at 1422–26.
333 See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law,
59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 812–13 (2007).
334 See generally MOTOMURA, supra note 330, at 26–37 (giving examples on how contrac-
tual mode principles have shaped federal immigration laws).
335 DESIPIO & PACHON, supra note 238.
336 See PIVENS & CLOWARD, supra note 78, at 55.
337 See WELCH & BLEDSOE, supra note 153, at 3.
338 See Kwong, supra note 286, at 77.
339 See id.
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power, there is also little incentive for them to get involved. These are not develop-
ments that happened to occur at the same time that the federal government was
negotiating immigration. Rather, they are part and parcel of the ongoing negotiation
process between immigrants and the United States government.
C. The Changing Political Context
My last observation is an appreciation of how much the foundation of politics
has changed over the years. It is common for us to compare the assimilation of today’s
immigrants with those in the past.340 Yet, as we see, when it comes to political assim-
ilation, to do so is comparing apples and oranges. Arriving during entirely different
eras of electoral politics, it is difficult to make any meaningful comparisons of im-
migrant political behavior across time. If anything, doing so simply draws more at-
tention to how radically our own political system has changed.
Take, for example, Hajnal and Lee’s diagnosis of immigrant political apathy
today.341 Rather than focusing on why immigrants are not voting, they turned their
attention to why immigrants are not identifying themselves politically to the same
degree that native black and white people do.342 Their answer is that most immi-
grants do not yet understand the nuances of America’s ideological divide.343 As they
argue, the “ability to place themselves along the traditional American ideological
spectrum from fervent liberals to ardent conservatives is likely to influence not only
how these political newcomers place themselves on issues, but also whether they
deem politics to be a civic activity worth pursuing.”344
Given the importance of ideology, and the political significance of a small num-
ber of ideologically fused wedge issues, it makes sense that immigrants would be
disinterested in politics until they’ve assimilated this important piece of America’s
collective conscious. Looking at the response of immigrants across time draws into
sharp contrast how uniquely specific this path of political assimilation is to our mod-
ern political system. The political machines that the first wave of immigrants faced
were notably non-ideological.345 This meant that they often had no grand political
vision once they assumed power, with the exception of maintaining that power.346
But unlike today’s ideological litmus, the “clientist” and “service-based” style of
340 See HAJNAL & LEE, supra note 246, at 150.
341 See id. at 206.
342 See id. at 179.
343 See id. at 167.
344 Id.
345 See James C. Scott, Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change, 63 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 1142, 1144 (1969) (“The machine is rather a non-ideological organization interested
less in political principle than in securing and holding office for its leaders and distributing
income to those who run it and work for it.”).
346 See id.
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politics was easily recognized and understood by the immigrants they recruited.347
Assimilation then was easy, because politics simply asked immigrants to decide
whether they expected to receive more benefit going with one party as opposed to
the next.
CONCLUSION
Immigrant political assimilation in the United States is shaped in large part by
the legal and political structure of its cities. It is here that most immigrants groups
gain access to meaningful political power.348 It is also here that political rifts be-
tween immigrant and native first arise.349 As we have seen, for much of American
history, the political behavior of successive waves of immigrant groups has been
shaped by the structure of the urban political system. And in return, enthusiasm and
concern about immigrant political participation has made and remade the political
structure of America’s cities. Understanding this relationship not only sheds light on
how our nation has negotiated the political impact of immigration on the American
polity. It also shows how the very model of political assimilation that immigrants
face is shaped by the urban areas that they call home.
347 See supra notes 146–49 and accompanying text.
348 See HAJNAL & LEWIS, supra note 255, at 646.
349 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 315 (giving an example of conflict between immigrants
and natives in New York).
